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1. Foreign Direct Investments (TDD: Short Overview and Hypothesis
ajKSilloli
The today's world economy is goring through various kinds of great changes, 
certainly one of the most important of them is the de-localisation of industrial 
production from the matured capitalistic countries (e.g. USA, Western Europe 
and Japan) in the 'developing-coimtnesPAlmong:tliefdeveloping fcoiintnes < of‘Latin 
America, South-East Asia, from the late 1980's the former socialist countries of 
Central and Eastern-Europe'Kave 'biec^e^import^t^t^gel? countries3for FDI.' " , ’ > * i ■ J T^ ' '■ *"* ' *■ j * yThe economic significance of these* changes is^weH'iUustratedsby'thefact that the 
Foreign Direct Investment in the last three decade has risen faster than exports, 
GDP. (Carsonf 4 9 9 8 :5 )^ 3*i3«w0 ai fltti.tashcvk'I .i £
Evaluating tK$ agjiific^ce^d^the^rble •r6f*FDi!/*itr-isr necessary *tol distinguish 
between 'portfolio' investment and 'direct capital ihvestmentri-Ihfth'e^first case, 
the investors are buying securities issued by companies or foreign governments' 
bonds, but they do rnot practice d\mefship^ng&ts t^6‘ control-the’ operation .of. the 
foreign company. In the second case, investors also intend■to > practice; their 
ownership rights acquired in the foreign company in question. The following 
types of 'direct capit'^mv^s1m^ntefN coiild be distiriguishied (Arvaf tf994:>8):' f.
? ’ uob>-}2 "ifrnbdsltoMsB,, io m bO onT
a). Foundation of new companies, mainly in the form of the 'green-field'
^1 sites?0 sili m ^ nilinoqC) airai? sift lo sf^ndifciD has A .1
b). Purchase of a controlling ownership stake in an existing foreign firm;
1 c). Reinvestmerit^of profit "earned in^a f^oreign^ompariyj oCAdrmioae/I .£.£
d). Lending and raising capital between the parent company and its
* k subsidiary bperatingdn^the-fdrei^i country! aimo/iooSl an aorgofl .t.Z
FDP4s ^ not*per-"se?benevolentiforiItHeIrel:eivingHrcountryijSch61ars have 
distinguished between 'colomalvitype'i:'capitalsexports ahdru'tradeo generating' 
investments. Colonial type capital export aims at raw material extraction, etc. 
arid in general does not generate a noticeable economic development.>forithe 
receiving country. The so-called trade generating (and not trade substituting) 
capital investment develops export capacities in the target countries andithus 
gives way to an increase in world export. The South-East Asian countries have 
received such type of capital export from Japan in the early 1970's before they 
themselves became export oriented countries.
The transformation process related modernisation in the post-socialist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) would be unimaginable without significant 
FDI and the related privatisation - in spite of the anti-foreign campaign of the 
populist-nationalist forces in these countries. For instance, in the Hungarian 
case, foreign-owned firms are producing up to 70 per cent of manufactured 
exports, up from 50 per cent in 1993 and the strongest labour productivity 
increase was experienced in the last five years in the foreign-owned joint 
ventures (Hamori, 1996:10.)
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There is a commonly shared hypothesis among the business scientists (Soulsby- 
Clark, 1996:) that among the foreign-owried firms, Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) are playing key role in modernizing managerial organization and 
methods of the privatized former large state firms. Moreover, these firms have 
become not only the 'engines' of export performance but have accelerated the 
introduction of new technology and of new managerial practices in the post- 
socialist economies (e.g. TQM, team-working, flat-hierarchy, outsourcing, 
benchmarking etc.). Due to the important facilitator role of FDI in shaping the 
patterns of skill and manpower use, it is worth to give a short survey on the FDI 
in the transformation economies of the CEE.
Among the post-socialist countries of the Central and Eastern European 
region, Hungary received the largest portion of the FDI until the middle of 1996; 
its share represents USD 15.1 billions. (But Poland is beginning to edge out 
Hungary in the race for FDI’)
The distribution of the FDI between economic sectors in the country is the 
following (ftepszabadsag, 1996: 10.):
• Industry: more than 50 per cent;
• Telecommunication: 15 per cent;
• Energy sector: 13 per cent;
• Financial sector: 6 per cent;
• Wholesale sector: 6 per cent; - . , :
• Others: 10 per cent.
The composition of the FDI within the country is very unequal, which 
further strengthens the existing inequalities in Hungary^If we are using a three- 
point scale to characterise the level of economic development- the following three 
regions should be distinguished:
a). 'Strong regions'; .  ^ -
b).'Intermediary regions'; ,
c). 'Weak or peripheral regions'.
The so-called 'strong-regions' (e.g., the agglomeration of Hungarian 
capital and the Northers Transdanubian regions) received almost as much as 
three quarters (73.5 per cent) of the country' FDI. The 'intermediary region' (e.g. 
the Great Hungarian Plain) and the 'weak and peripheral' regions (e.g. the 
Northern-Eastern Hungary and the South Trans-Danubia) have similar share 
(13 - 13.5 per cent) of FDI. (Csefalvay, 1993.) Since the middle of 1990's, this 
pattern of FDI distribution in the country has remained the same! For instance 
the capital of the newly created foreign owned firms in the Hungarian capital in 
1997, represented 77.7 per cent of the total foreign capital. (Toth, 1998: 30.)
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-YUilnocThe iGEEfregionrhasIattracted^significant^^Aimt^ofiforedgnjmvgstoent 
since; 1989,'with Hungaryjreceived 557 periCentjpf^xlong-term FDI in) the region) 
imoreithanrUSp,(13fbilIipnsjby the;endJoff;1995. ^However, ^ ssi^despite t^he'-qften 
cited USD; 13;billion figure, needs facing the; regionjRale] to ;thf capital.in-flow. 
France, for example,! has!received;more foreigniinyestment mjjiie^ast^pxyears 
than the entire iEasterniBlock3hasvreceiyed£since,[;19893j (EUmgstad,^
Since that the .size of FDI invested in, Hungary oyerjpassed thejUSDjlS bntiqn,at 
the endioft?1996! ahdlrepresentsr40)pericent qfiFDIitargeted to jthe(CEE5region.r 
(A rv a , 'i l9 9 /7 :^ 1 0 0 8 i) j ,i{) f l s r. i "  j >, r iJuov/ el Hi ,scu  'ts ’voqn uca  bn s.; H h lz  io  a m a ttm i
..'iIKO Qolmouxrjs noiii'.m'idiRmrti odi ixi 
Within the broad range of FDI, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
investments 9 into b^green-fleldlvei^uSiorlbrojm'fi&ldaositesq gThejiH.green-field' 
investments were [carry, out by? such internationally ^ well-known firms* as|Suzuki, 
IBM, TDK,f Sony,t<Ford,-etc. iThel 'brown-fieldainvestments ;w,ere ^ carried .out by 
such multinational firms as NOKIA, Siemens, (G.Er Audir,ietc.| xThese;j-twq 
distinctive forms of FDI have different impact on the restructuring or 
mbdernizing busihess organizations[in)thettransformation;ecpnomies ofjthe GEE 
region. According to our hypothesis, more balancedidistributionspf^green-fieldl 
and 'brown-field' investments speed-up the diffusion of modern managerial 
knowledge and organization. In other words, thediffusioniofnew^echnplqgy.and 
leading edge management practices willjicreate( istwnger^midtipheriV or 
homogenizing effects in organizing economic activities £m:r.cpmpmsonj to 
domination of either 'brown-field' or 'green-£eld\:myesjtmen^.^3o^e^^jqids., 
the strong presence of foreign owned firms, especially;in the form-ofy greenrfield' 
sites, does not speed up the diffusion of state of art technology,and management 
methods in the FDI receiving country
.;bi'dw ,J»0pyrm >nov si vxli/woo sd l n ld im  JXI^ I y/f.j m iiotii«oqmoy ;?dT
- -fir a ^ e arolei3of:/.ppi/.in^ iupgra^g)igu^i1y; leyeljof products,, services,[and 
managementis signific^tnptpiriyfmithe^ of CEE but
also in the countries belonging to the matured market economies. ^  
the study made by McKinsey, the US management consultant firm, more than 
two-thirds of UK suppliers, 44 per cent of US suppliers and085rperccent of 
Japanese suppliers received his high evaluation of quality^TDp} management in 
the UK car component industry „has ... devoted its^mtenseLyjjto ^ quadity^ more 
than that of any other country in Europe”, says the report. According to the 
McKinsey,!the driYmg;fprce;behind the.changein Britain hassbeen, the influence 
of cariplants set-up, by^tfap^esejgwup^^eyiave^made^uppmgjquality level i... 
a matter of survival for British suppliers”,.says the repprt, of the US maaagement 
consulting firm, j GermanjCompanies, in contrast, have lackedithisistimulus. The 
report says,their ^ catchrUR;effort^will:need tojbegin ^thjajto^^ 
current!llevels of , over0complexitynr..?sand; a;focus pni-strategically, important 
(man agement), Revels j (for r change) In , the, <case j of j Germ any, ,; to ^ management 
commitmentito/fluahtyiwhichfhas beenpidyrayerage: to date,^ ;^^ 11 need to; greatly 
increase’;,;;thef report} w,sras,r)wMeLcqmp^es)AYltt29ls.9.in®64 jto t-fonqw t^he^UK 
example of operating more „team-working” on factory floors to harness the
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„problem solving” skills of employees: (Marsh, 1996.)
Before presenting the pattern of FDI in the so-called 'Visegrad countries' 
- Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia - it is worth to have a look on the 
general weight off FDI in the post-socialist countries of Eastern European region.
Table 1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDD in Eastern Europe (in million USD)
: Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Annual FDI flow
Bulgaria 10 20 100 130 200 105 98 150 813
Romania 20 18 187 240 221 341 367 . 555 . 2080:
Slovakia 53 130 . 350 181 180: 150 I960;
Slovenia 10 20 100 130 200 128 176 .160 1900,
Ukraine 10 50 100 280 520 91 266 440 1757.
Czech Republic 10 166 200 1210 600 750 2525 1200 68001
Poland 60 88 470 830 1100 1600 1134 2300 92001
Hungary 500 900 1700 1700 2550 - 1300 4500 : 1900: 1505
i, L. (1997), 'Kulfoldi mDkodOtDke, hazai beszallitoi kapcsolatok, kulkereskedelmi 
merleg es technologiatranszfer. Kozgazdasagi Szemle. XLIV evf. november. p. 1008.
In the case of the so-called 'Visegrad-countries' - which are in the focus o f; 
our study - the weight of FDI in the middle of 1990's (measured by. USD/capita) 
presented in the Table 2.
Countries 1995 1996
in USD per capita
Czech Republic 563 660.19 :
Hungary 1.410 1.505
Poland 177 ■
Slovakia 138 369.81
Source: Business Central Europe, 1996: 39, Arva, L. 1997: 1008.
Following the earlier presented hypothesis, the simultaneous and 
balanced presence o f 'green-field' and 'brown -field' in vestmen ts have stronger 
'harbinger effect' in diffusing new managerial skill and practices than the one­
sided dominance of either 'green-field' or 'brown-field' investments. In relation 
to that, we may further develop the following hypothesis: in a post-socialist 
economy, where the 'mono pattern' of FD I is dominant (either in the form of 
green-field' or brown-field' sites), the multiplier effects of FD I on the business 
performance (e.g. labour productivity) is more limited (creating only islands of us 
modern technology and management practice) compared with the presence of 
'hetero-pattern'of FDI.
Comparing the 10 top investments in the two Visegrad countries' having 
the highest par capita FDI, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we may identify 
significant differences, see the tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 Ten top investments in the Czech Repub’ic
Investor (country) Target Commitment Sector
1. Tel source (NL, CH) ■ SPT Telecm USD 1.423 m telecom.
2. Volkswagen (G) Skoda Auto USD 962 m automobile ;
3. Inter.Oil (NL, USA) Unipetrol USD 615 m petroleum !
4.Philip Morris (USA) Tabak USD 500m : tabacco
5. Steyr (A-Daewo-K) Avia . USD 384 m automobile
6. IFC Kaiser (USA) ' NovaHuta' USD 231 m steel
7. Linde (G.) ' . Technoplin : USD 154 ! industrial gas
8. Energy consortium (USAy Energeticke centrum : USD 154 energy
,9. Pepsi-Cola (USA) Green-field site USD 120 ■ soft-drink
10. Glo verb al (Belgium) Glasunion USD 115 ' glass
Source: Business Central Europe, 1996:. 54.
Table 4 Ten ton investments in Hungary
Investors (country) Target Commitment Sector
l.Magyar Com. (G., USA) .. Matav USD 875 telecom.
2. General Electric (USA) Tungsram usd 600 lighting. -
3. AUDI (G.) Green-field site USD 350 automobile
4. General Motors (USA) Green-field site USD 383 automobile (
5. Suzuki (Japan) Green-field site! USD 280 •automobile
6. Douwe-Egbert (NL) ! Compack j USD 150 food
7. UNILEVER (NL, UK) : Green-field site USD 150 consumer goods
8. ALCOA (USA) Kofem ... USD 146 . aluminum, .
9. Pepsi-Cola . . ; Green-field site USD 135 soft-drin ■:
10. AEGON International (NL) AB-Aegon USD 135 insurance . .
Source: Business Central Europe, 1996: 54., .
In Hungary, not only in the case of the 10 top investments, but also in the 
whole process of privatization, the more balanced distribution of FDI (or 'hetero- 
pattern' of FDI) and greater variety in ownership, and organizational forms have 
speed up the managerial, learning process and created different 'priority list' of 
managerial problems in the Hungarian firms compared to,the other countries of 
CEE. (According to the. leading expert of the. Hungarian FDI, ten investors 
represent the 50 per cent of the, all. green-field sites. The most significant green- 
field investors are the followings: GM, Audi, Suzuki, IBM, Ford, Guardian Glass, 
Philips, Souftec, L.U.K., and Procter and Gamble, Nepszabadsag, 1998.a.)
It is extremely difficult to get reliable information on the. uneven pace of the
managerial and organizational learning process in, the post-socialist firms. Until 
now, we have very few sector or region oriented comparative studies on the firm 
level transformation process in the transformation economies. In the next parts, 
we present the main results of an international comparative survey on changing 
ownership and the related organizational restructuring process in the 'Visegrad- 
countries'. Following this presentation we try to identify the key impacts of FDI, 
using the empirical evidences from a regional study J of Szekesfehervar.
2. Uneven Pace in Restructuring Business Organizations. Lessons from the 
Sector Focused 'Hokkaido Project'
The Hokkaido Project initiated survey was conducted in Spring 1996 in 
the firms employing at least 500 employees in the machine industrial sector in 
the 'Visegrad countries' . (1) During the survey, each national team participating 
in the Project, used the same structured interview conducted with top managers 
of the firms surveyed (usually general director).
The interviews focused on the following items:
• corporate governance;
• patterns of communication channels;
• current Business performance and main effecting factors;
• firm-level labor relations;
v • influence distribution in the firms'decision making system.
In relation to modernizing business organizations, we devote core 
attention to transferring managerial skills arid organization from Western 
Europe into the post-socialist countries of CEE, the focus of analysis will be 
centered on changing managerial tasks and influence structure to map the 
possible uneven development in the managerial and organizational learning 
process.
According to the data of this survey, 54;4 per cent of the Hungarian managers 
interviewed classify their firms' state of business achievement as successful, a 
figure considerable higher than the 25.4 per cent average for the other three 
'Visegrad countries'. (See Table 5.)
Table 5 Present state of business achievement in the 'Visegrad couritries'
State of business Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Successful 20.0 % 54:5 % 43.3 %' ' ' 13.0 %
Recovering 56:6 % 34:3 % 46.6 ,%■ ' •60.9 %
Stagnant ' ' 16.7 % 8.6% ' 6.7% •21.7%
Declining 1 : 6.7 % ■ 0.0% ' 0.0 % - 4.4%
On the verge of 
bankruptcy
; 0.0 % 2.6% - 3.4 % ' 0.0%
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Source: The Hokkaido Project (1996)
While such bright figures may seen counterintuitive given Hungary very 
lackluster GDP and employment figures in 1996, this can partly explained by the 
very uneven patterns of economic recovery in this country - both by sectors and 
regions - and also the relatively large rele foreign capital has played in 
transforming Hungarys' machine industry. (In the machine industry sector 
surveyed, 37 per cent of Hungarian firms are majority foreign owned, compared 
with 6.6 per cent in Poland, 3.3 per cent in the Czech Republic, and 8.3 per cent 
in Slovakia.) The finding of this survey are backed by the results of other projects, 
including a 1048-firm survey carried out by the Economic Research Institute 
(GKI), which reveals lags, both between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms, and foreign-owned (which are mostly manufacturing) and domestic firms. 
Further, despite weak macro-level economic performance, there are indeed areas
- particularly in export oriented manufacturing - which give cause for optimism. 
The utilization of many meso-level and firm-level viewpoints may in the end be 
more telling than broad, macro-level figures most casual observers rely om The 
evidences learned from the machine industry sector survey, already at the 
beginning of 1996 have anticipated the economic upswing of the Hungarian 
economy, which were know for the large public only since the 1997, when such 
macro-economic indicators as GDP growth, employment level etc. visible 
improved.
The uneven development of organizing economic activities in the past and 
the variety of privatization process after 1990, have strong impact on the speed of 
the managerial learning process in post-socialist firm of the CEE region. The 
unequal stages in the development of the organizational restructuring are well 
reflected in the differences identified in the prioritized list of measures by firms' 
management in the machine industry sector.
(It is worth to note that frem 1998's there is a growing awareness even among 
the world leading consulting firms on the uneven character of economic 
development in the emerging market economies in the region. For instance, the 
well-known US Merrill Lynch and Co. London base office distinguished the 
following three phases of the post-socialist industrial economies: ,,The first is 
value investment, when investors first discover an economy. Resources may be 
cheap, but there is a high political risk that reforms may not come through in the 
near future and a large potential for macro-economic shocks, including inflation 
and trade deficit. As those risks diminish and if reformers stay in power, stock 
become attractive. Substantial amounts of foreign capital flow into the countries, ; 
and the markets begin to perform well, ...this is th .^ transition-to-growth phase. 
For those who; know what to look for, it can be the ideal season for stock hunting: 
One stocks reach fair value, compared with price-to-earnings ratios in developed ; 
markets, investors need an incentive to stay. Earnings growth is usually the key.
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This takes time to deliver. Companies must restructure and do all the nastv
things that that word implies, lav off workers: improve efficiency:__develop new
products, marketing and sales techniques: invest in equipment and dump 
Communist-era managers who cannot adopt. Until the whole process is well 
underway, there is rarely anv visible earning growth, largely because there are 
no profits. One the restructuring occurs, an economy enters ... the growth - 
investment phase, when well-tuned companies pump out products and services, 
increasing earnings and the value of their shares. ... Hungary had reached 
phase three* largely with the help of foreign direct and strategic investors ... 
Poland is near the end of phase two. Many Polish corporations are only now being 
handed of to private investors. Stuck deep in phase two with little sign of 
movement is the Czech Republic, where a voucher privatization plan pumped 
little cash into companies”) (Green, 1998.a: 17.)
According to the results of the Hokkaido Project, in the case of Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, managers interviewed still place a high 
priority (ranked second in all of these three countries) on employment reduction, 
commonly associated as a 'firm-internal transformational problems'. Hungarian 
managers, on the other hand, focus almost exclusively on product and market- 
oriented issues: customers and suppliers, R and D, in addition the increase of 
exports are the primary focal points. Dividing the list of measures into two rough 
categories ’firm internal transformation, and "market/product oriented' or 'firm 
external ^ and summing responses, one finds that Hungary's scores much lower 
in the 'firm internal transformation! measures, 37.6 per cent in Hungary 
compared to 63.3 per cent in Poland, 56.9 per cent in the, Czech Republic, and 
58.0 per cent in Slovakia.
The differences may be the result of either, or both, of the two factors:
• Hungarian firms in the machine industrial sector are slightly ahead of other 
'Visegrad-countries' firms in transforming their enterprises, because of a more 
ambitious privatization program (while a slightly higher proportion of all 
Czech business are privately owned, the networks of investment fund and
: bank ownership make for a more convoluted owner-management behavior) 
and a higher degree of foreign ownership; and/or
• Firm, 'internal-transformational' issues in Hungarian firms are dwarfed by 
'market-oriented': problems caused by the break-up of the COMECON (former 
economic integration institution: „ Council for Mutual Economic Aid”) trading 
regime. Hungary has neither the large internal market of Poland (noticeable 
in the relatively smaller importance given to export by Polish firms) nor the
. long history of export- orientation for the machine industry that 
Czechoslovakia had even within the former COMECON.
Although Hungarian firms arguably face more difficult market conditions 
for their products; for both geographic and economic reasons, the likely
fundamental reason for the differing emphasis observed lies fundamentally in 
the temporal component having to do with the particularities of the different 
market environments. While Hungary and Poland experienced what is politely 
called „shock therapy”, Poland^s slower privatization regime and slightly more 
protectionist trade laws at the outset of the transformation provided a larger 
cushion - and a lower set of incentives to transform the firm - than was presented 
to Hungarian firms: Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced sharp 
falls in demand, but as alluded to earlier, firms owned by investment funds have 
often been in the functional equivalent of privatization half-way house. The 
differences are temporal in that the general goals, broadly defined, will be 
reached by all 'Visegrad countries' in the not too distant future (it is important to 
keep in mind that this enormous ‘transformation project" was embarked upon 
but few years ago). To the extant that one gives credence to this explanation, one 
also assumes that the vast majority of these Hungarian firms have already more 
or less turned the corner, while 'Visegrad firms"'are to varying extent still 
engaged in, and beginning to emerge from, the process of fundamental 
transformation.
It is worth noting that a surprisingly large number of Hungarian 
managers surveyed in machine industry sector, reported to have increased efforts 
on research and development, which may also be seen as a sign that crisis times 
in the machine industry are over (as returns on R and D outlays usually accrue in 
the longer-term, beyond the horizon of a firm'struggling just to survive or in the 
phase of „ growth-investment phase” using the earlier mentioned distinction of 
'Merill Lynch and Co.). In the last decade, R and D activities in Hungarian firms 
have declined precipitously, with 57 per cent of firms claiming no R and D 
activity whatsoever, and there have been fears that Hungary is losing R and D 
capacity, both as a result of economic stagnation and the tendency of foreign 
firms to build manufacturing capacity in Hungary, but keep R and D functions 
near: company headquarters: In the next part dealing with the regional- 
dimension of the FDI and the transformation process, we present more details on 
the lack of interests of the Multinationals Companies towards the use of the 
Hungarian R and D potential. However, two large companies, AUDI and Knorr 
Bremse in car industry, General Electric in lighting industry and Nokia in 
telecom etc. have recently announced plans to move R and D facilities to Hungary, 
to be closer to their factories here. (The other good news related to the revival of 
IKARUS^ the well-known bus manufacturer, which almost disappeared following 
the collapse of the COMECON market. During its restructuring process - among 
other things - an American-Hungarian joint-venture of IKARUS, „NABI” was 
established in 1993, represents a text-book example' how to combine Western 
management methods and financing. As the founder of joint-venture (^NABI”) - 
an enterprising Hungarian emigre -noticed:,,Originally, our advantage was cost... 
our other big advantage is the design team.”, (Green, 1998.b.: 11) This mean the 
foreign investors are discovering hot only the advantages of the cheap and skilled 
labor force, but also the flexible and innovative engineering skill necessary for
it)
original design in such competitive market as USA.)
The degree to which the CEE countries are able to compete on more 
favorable terms of long-term trade will depend largely on their ability to be price 
and qualitative-competitive not just in manufacturing, but also in product and 
process innovation. :
A glance at current capacity utilization illustrates the relatively successful 
restructuring process of management and, organization in the Hungarian 
machine industry. See table 6 on the next page.
Table 6 Current cajpacitv utilization
Capacity utilization Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
0-10% t -
•/ 11 - 20 % r• -' , - -• ■ 3%.
21-30% , • * - - . - ■
31-40% : 3.7% . 3.0% • 3.0 %.
, 41-50%. 14.8% 8.8% - . 13.3 % .
51 - 60 %• 14.8 % 20.0% . 16.7%,
61 - 70 % 14.8 % 14.7 % 16.7 % 27.8 %
. 71-80% 22.2 % 14.7% • 33.3 % 27.8 %,
'81-90% .18.5 % 20.6 % 13.3% 11.1%
91-100% .11.1% . 35.3 % 16.7%.
Average ; 73.1 % 81.6 % 68.5% . 71.5%
Source: The Hokkaico Project, 1996.
With an average utilization rate of 81.6 per cent, Hungary falls 
comfortable within OECD averages; and provides added proof that in the 
machine industry sector, the depth of the crisis have already been reached. Of 
special note is the fact that fully 35.3 per cent of firms are operating at 91 - 100 
per cent capacity, and a majority of firms (55.9 per cent) are* operating above 81 
per cent of capacity.
Using the international comparison of the countrys' competitiveness, 
among the 46 countries, in 1998 Hungary produced the most striking 
improvement. His position improved by 8 places and is represents the 28th 
country, following Spain and Portugal. Hungary is participating in the 
international evaluation procedure from 19941 In 1994 and 1995 the country had 
41 position, in 1996: 39 position, in -1997: 36 position. According to the evaluation, 
in the last five years Hungary improved the efficiency/quality in the field of 
government, infrastructure and financial services. The other fields of positive 
changes are the following: participation in the international trade, quality of 
company management, enterprising ability and scientific/technological 
development. Among Poland, Czech Republic and Russia, Hungary received the
best evaluation on the indicator^ 6¥Jcbuntiysi'comipetitiveness:i(Eiy'G,!'1998:33;).ho
>70/:* ;;o 'j.kiqrnoo cJ ->kki sxe aardfn/oa 5130 eili iloiifv; oj oor'iob etlT
2.1 Privatization  ^in-Hurigarv  ^Creating Real Qwhers an^Managers-.oj ‘n'knovr'i
nn-.; j:>uijo';q m mb; lud ni :i?.w[ ion yvl.)byqmoa-svj;lf;jiln;jp .bun
Almost a decade past since the collapse of the state-socialist: political- 
economic regime, but until now we have rather few firm or meso-level empirical 
studies oil the impact of privatization and'the transformation ofithe' managerial 
labor pr6cess7fAccbrdirig5to:the-lessons learned- from the previous] section;' the 
ownership (either state or private)^matters (nothin dtselfrhutfiniJthei formssof 
investment in new technology and introducing new managerial concepts and 
methods (e.g. world leading management practice).
............ '... ______ ___ __________ _ _______________  M‘<f ’ ' 1 i' ’ ■ • > ,f> ’ _< ”) ykliiT^
Fortunately, recentlyi'sever^ .studiesihave been carried out-on the changing j 
.governance 'and. organization. structure.in_ both„ppst-priyatize'd_or jnewly created I 
p rivate firms in~ the p ost-socialistcountries. (Child-Markoczy, „ 1993., • Simon-i
Davies, 1996., -Child-Czegledy, L-1996.,1_AdorjanrBalaten-Galgoczi-Mako-
Ternovszky, 1996^ : Whitley-Czab^,^1998.,-iT6th,fLU1998.)i Theselihteresting 
studies have no primarily- ambition to - comp are.the development of m anagement J 
and business organization at sector level among the GEE.countries.
.... .......................j_ .___ .................-.....!.......... ....................... j. . - U*
‘ i! ;.{ r » *  S ■ i W) ^  ; ! 1 ~n ........  I  - —  “ ^ ^
The otherw;ave of;stu&es, dominating thescene of social debate in Huiigary^ arei 
dealing with manageirient -as-a-distinctive social-occupational group and its rolei 
in the emerging new poHtical-econdmic;elite: In the center of-this interest* among {
* * I \ i  ^ \ ' 5 1 X } * * ) ''■ '  ^ f   ^ C*‘  ^ i V V | 4  ^C * ‘ »  ^J  ^*. ‘
other things, is the degree of autonomy practiced by the. nejw owner - visij'a-vis the 
management. One school of thought, most commonly ‘ass6&ated‘J‘mml '^the 
University of California's Ivan Szelenyi, holds that firm-internal 
transformational, processes a are slowed;1 (or cat least not promoted), by<jtop and 
middle-level managers,\who m^ntaui.controlpve£thereveryday^workings of the 
firm andv^ yho. still operate,vto ^ some^degree, according to non-m^ket*vand.often 
clanistic incentives .(or- regulation), which,previously( e^sted.:(Szelenyi,, 1996.),In 
contrast, University , of Gelumbia's DavidStark hasi;foundithat. given the, proper 
conditions, owners, not manager, hold the upper hand and jmey^e,jmdeea 
willing and capable of intervention to protect their own interest. (Stark, 1996.)
• ’ , u; OD f i ' l ' i . U W O O  O ff. } ; 0  u l i i O ' j .  C O i
In jthej earlier, section presented data^of then Hokkaido Project', carried out at .the
beginning of 1966 m effect mirror, not only ,tins debate but inform us also bnfthe
uneven developmentof the relations between owners and, managers as well as of
the managerialjmnleamingu process.; (Yamamurajlslnkawa-Makq-Elhh
1996.), First, fby, examining the relative decision (making<power, of, top.}mangers
compared»to .the owners, we see that oymers,are-morej^oweiivd^emctiy^ where we
expectthe-appointment;of managing, director,^capital, invest^ Pr?fiP
distribution. vrsnv) otii si uoijjuiiiiihrui -d; n-;«.
i c u . i i ; . m i  !h is>  i i i l i U i ,  j j t i i s i " ! !  t r i o  fJ i i t " ; s i o i 1 i'i/jfsfxs V i i f i f f . rn * ; : ;
However, ini questions; of reorganization,} the .pyerwhelming. b^ance of
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power falls to top management, which is, after all, chosen by owners The rather 
large gulf m the reorganization category does suggest that management enjoys 
considerable flexibility in pursuing ownership's strategic goals, as expressed 
through capital investment and the appointment of the managing director.
An interesting contribution to the debate over the efficiency of coupon 
privatization can be observed with the results that show the Czech Republic, on 
average, as having the lowest gulf in influence1 distribution between top 
management and ownership. This seems to suggest that the huge investment 
funds in the Czech Republic (and to a more Hmited extent, Slovakia);take a more 
active role in management than has previously been ascribed to -them. Poland, 
having the largest proportion of state-owned firms - in the machine industry 
firm's sample of'Hokkaido-Project ' -predictably shows the largest gap between 
top mangers and owners.
; The differences between top and middle management are significantly 
larger in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia than in Hungary and Poland, 
suggesting that indirectly - through the appointment of top managers - Czech 
and Slovak owners have more influence over the every day operations of the 
firms surveyed.
2.2 Variety in Forms of Privatization facilitates the Restructuring of Business 
Organizations
The results of the extensive privatization programs in the CEE region 
over almost the p ast decade are evident. According to the World B ank rep ort, the 
private ownership is dominant both in the share of employment and in GDP in 
the post-socialist countries of CEE region. (Borish-Noel, 1996.) In the Hungarian 
case, due to the rapid and strategic privatization* the contribution of the private 
sector about 75-80 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) compared with 
10 per cent ten years ago.
In examining the results of privatization at sector level (e.g. machine 
industry) we may discover noticeable variety in forms of the ownership. For 
Hungary, only 14.3 per cent of firms sampled are classified as a state-owned 
joint-stock company, (i.e., the stocks are majority-owned by state holding 
company), with no firms being classified as traditional state owned enterprises 
(SOE). See table 7!
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Table 7 Types and Legal Forms of Enterprise (Sample of machine industrial firms)
Forms of Ownership Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary
1. State enterprise „ 26.7% - . 3.3 % 4.2% - 0.0%
2. Former state firm:
a. State-owned joint-stock co. 36.7 % 3.3 % 12.5 % 14.3 %
b. Privatized joint-stock co. 30.0 % 70.0% 58.3 % 22.9 %
c. Limited liability co. . 6.7% 3.3% 0.0 % 20.0 %
3. New private enterprise
a. Joint stock co. 0.0% 3.3 % . . 4.2 % . 2.9 %
c. Limited liability co. 0.0 % . 3.3 % 0.0 % 0.0%
4. Joint-ventures . 0.0 % . 3.3% . 8.3 % 20,0%
Other 0.0 % 10.0% 8.3 % ' 20.0 %
No answer 0.0 % -".0.0% 4.2 % 0.0%
Source: The Hokkaido Project, 1996.
A rather small percentage - 2.9 per cent in the case of Hungary - of firms 
are newly created 'green-field' sites. Green-field sites, which have attracted 
increasing attention as the CEE countries become an increasingly attractive 
location for exp orting into the EU, are likely underrepresented precisely because 
they are new in the period of our survey. (Note: in the next section of this piaper 
we shall present the results of a regional project (REGIS: Regional Innovation 
System) carried out in a region where 'green-field sites' have higher
concentration rate than the national.) —
In relation to the privatization process it is worth mentioning the variety 
of approaches adopted by the former socialist countries. As one foreign observer 
noticed; „After initially utilizing 'spontaneous' privatization, Hungary has used 
the so-called 'strategic' privatization method, whereby the willingness and 
capacity to invest in the privatized company is often given as much weight as the 
actual bidprice. This approach tend to favor larger (mainly foreign) investors as 
opposed, for example, Czech coupon privatization, which concentrates control in 
the hands of banks and investment funds often via domestic investors. As such 
post-privatized companies in Hungary generally offer a more visible contrast to 
their predecessors than for instance in the Czech Republic, where the picture is 
more blurry because, of slower, more convulated changes in management 
structure.” (Ellingstad, 1996: 48) According to the opinion of a well-known 
Hungarian FDI expert, the „...it is widely known that due to the positive 
professional expectation in relation with the foreign investments, the Hungarian 
government rejected the coupon based privatization and instead'created an 
environment favorable for the strategic foreign investors.” (Akar, 1997: 1008.)
It is not surprising, therefore, that Kornai analysis on the economic 
restructuring process in the CEE countries and Russia explains the impressive 
labor productivity development in Hungary - among other factors (i.e., sever 
budget constraints, no more 'unemployment' within factory gate) - by the
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positive impact of privatization schemes which did create 'real owners' pushing 
managers to initiate and carry out deep restructuring in their firms and are 
creating strong profit motivation within management. See Table 8!
Table 8 Labor Productivity in the 'Visegrad countries'
Country Average Labor Productivity (Real GDP/employment;. 1989=1)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Poland 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.98 1.00 1.07 .
Czech Republic 1.00 0.97 0.88 , 0.89 . .0.88 .. 0.91
Slovakia 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.96
Hungary 1.00 0.98 0.92 1.05 1.11 1.16
Source: Kornai. J. (1996).'Kiigazitas recesszio nelkiil’, Kozgazdasagi Szemle, XLIII. Evf. 
julius-augusztus, p. 609.
Explaining the better productivity figures in Hungary, it is necessary to 
emphasis the 'core roles' of the 'green-field' sites of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) established by the large FDI inflow into the country. It is necessary to 
add to the Korna's explanation of labor productivity increase that the new 
manufacturing sites speed-up, the introduction of both new technologies and 
'leading-edge' managerial methods and practices in Hungary, Such well-known 
high-precision manufacturing firms as GM, Audi, Ford, IBM, Matsushita, Philips, 
Sony etc., were attracted to Hungarian location - and also in the other "Visegrad 
countries' - not merely by low-wages but the combination of low-wage rate and a 
relatively highly skilled work-force together with the relatively developed 
infrastructure and other advantages (i.e., tax .holiday, etc.); Ini the globalized! 
manufacturing environment today, quality, flexibility of work-force and market ! 
.opportunities are at least as important as low--wages. However, it is necessary to! 
stress the strong role of wage competition among the former socialist-countries* I 
For example, in the special .new year, number of 'Economist' dealing with the i 
next year tendency in 1997, we could read about the signs that western: 
comp anies already have discovered that. the.-Ukrainian labor at a cost of USD 40 j 
a monthjirresistibly attractive compared with Czech at 400 USD r in comparisons 
with German at USD 4.000 a month in the clothing industry sector. (Lacas, i 
1996:42.) _j ; :
In the weak labor market context in Hungary, MNCs or foreign owned; 
firms in general pay 20 - 30 per cent above average wages to/the blue-collar- 
workers to keep skilled employees. In the case of professionals and managers the I 
gap between..the, H;ungjman\and',Western European.'is- much more moderate.
Summing up, the Hungarian machine industry firms are in a slightly 
better, position than other .'Visegrad countries' , in ..transformation process, 
because of their woofer opportunities to learn in the former-socialist past.-Plus, 
the strategic privatization, and the'greater diversity of ownership structure
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increased the opportunities to acquire new managerial and organizational 
methods and practices.
It is necessary te note, that tHe role of foreign-owned firms in Hungary much 
more important in comparison not only with Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia but also with Austria. For instance, in the Hungarian manufacturing 
sector 36.1 per cent of work-force is employed by forelgn-owned companies, the j 
same indicator in the case of Austria is 32.9 per cent and in the Czech Republic 
only 13.1 per cent. In Hungary, 50 per cent of industrial output is produced by the 
subsidiaries of the foreign companies. (Nepszabadsag, 1998.b.: 14.)
2.3. Firm-level Patterns of Social Relationships__between Unions__and
Management
The labour relations component offer some very interesting findings, with 
numerous consequences both for Human Resource Management (HRM) and the 
labour market as a whole. Given Poland's recent history of comparatively higher 
strike rates (Mako-Simonyi, 1997.), it should come as no surprise that Poland's 
composite labour score is significantly above the other 'Visegrad countries'. If we 
try to compare the patterns of firm-level relationships between management and 
trade unions, the differences are visible. See the Table 9.
Countries “Mutual 
under­
standing and 
cooperating”
“Mainly 
cooperating, 
but sometimes 
opposing”
“Mainly 
opposing, but 
sometimes 
cooperating”
“Opposing and 
conflicting”
“Difficult do 
answer”
Czech Republic 
(n=35)
13% 53 % 28% 3 % .... 3 % .
Slovakia
(n=35)
. 4 % 73 % 19 % 4% 0.0%
Hungary
(37)
50% 44 % 3 % 0.0 % 3,0 %
Poland
(n=119)
a. Solidarnosc 
(n=98)
14.3 % 38.1 % 19.0 % 28.6 % 0.0 %
b. OPZZ 
(n=21)
16.7 % 50.0 % 22.2% 11.1 % 0.0%
Source: Ishikawa, A. (1998) 'Organization and Activity of Trade Union in Central and 
Eastern Europe', Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, March, Sapporo, 
Occasional Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World, No. 65. p. 22-23..
Kasahara, K. (1998) 'Introduction of Market Economy and Industrial Relations 
in Poland', Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, March, Sapporo, Occasional 
Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World, No. 64.. p. 59.
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Hungary represents on extreme, where the ,,mutual understanding and 
cooperation” characterize the firm-level relationships between trade unions an 
management. Poland located the other-extreme of the scale of pattern of social 
relations, where the „opposing and conflicting ’^ interests - especially in the case of 
„Solidarnosc” trade union - dominate the union and management relationship. 
Czech Republic and Slovakia have a middle position between Hungary and 
Poland on the scale of cooperation-conflict between union and management. An 
interesting comparison can bie’ made between Hungary and Poland. Poland 
history of strikes and relatively confrontational union-management relations - at 
a time of historical labour weakness - might support the conclusion that in the 
longer-term, Tyhen the period of transition passes and labour markets are 
presumably tighter, patterns of industrial relations will likely be spicier in 
Poland than elsewhere in the CEE region.
Table 10 Bottom-up Communication Channel on Wage-Related Issues
Channels of communication Poland Czech
Republic
Slovakia Hungary
Via trade union 77.6 % .46.7% . 47.8 28.6 :
Via Works Council (+) 0.0 % 0.0 % . 0.0% 28.6'%.
Via foreman or shop-floor chiefs 23.3 % 30.0 % 30.4% 5.7 % :
Via unofficial leaders 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%- . . 14.3 % : ■
Directly or individually by workers 0.0 % . 20.0 % - 13.0 % . 11.4 % : !
Other 0.0 % 3.3% ... 8.7%. 11.4 % . .
Note: Among the 'Visegrad countries', only the Hungarian Industrial Relations has the ;
institution of Works Council for the employee participation...............
Source: The Hokkaido Project, 1996..
The above presented Table shows how Poland reflects its history of trade 
union activism compared to the more indirect and subtle labor relations system 
which have arisen in the other 'Visegrad countries', especially in Hungary. In 
this country, the examination of the bottom-up communication channels, and the 
significant role of'informality'in the social relations of the firm.
The 'co-operative' pattern of union-management relations and the 
pluralistic communication channels are functioning as facilitators of 
organizational changes and new practices of human resources utilization in the 
Hungarian firms in comparison to other post-socialist companies in the CEE 
region. (2)
3. Role of Strong Region in Re-Organizing Economic Activities. The Case of 
..Szekesfehervar Region”
. The core interest, of the EU supported „Regional Innovation System” 
(REGIS) Project was to identify the existence or lack of existence of the regional 
innovation system in eleven European regions. (3)
In this section we intend to present the results of the Hungarian survey 
connected to the role of FDI. The firm level interviews were conducted at ,75 firms 
in the Szekesfehervar region, using standardized questionnaire elaborated and 
accepted by the all REGIS Project participants. The categories for the data 
analysis were selected on the basis of ownership structure (private ownership, 
joint-private/state ownership, and state-ownership), on the basis of firm age 
(green-field sites and brown-field sites), and on the basis of nationality of 
ownership (domestically owned and foreign owned firms). The Table 11 
illustrates the break-down of the categories which will be used for comparison.
Table 11 Categories utilized for Comparison
Hungarian Firms % of total % in Hxmgarian category N= :
Privately owned : . ! 41.3 ; 63.3 31 I
Private/State ownership 10.7 ............... 16.3 8 ;
State owned ■ 12.0' . 18.3 : • 9 ■;
Green-field site ■ i 7 , 12,7 . 19.1. . 9 • i
Brown-field site . 53.5 80.9 38
Total ’ ~ ‘ . 64.5 49 -
Foreign Firms " ’ ; ' % of total "Y % in Foreign category
Green-field site : .. 28.2......1 83.0 20
Brown-field site 5.6. 16.7 . . 4 .
Total ■ : 35.5 . 26
Source: Mako-Ellingstad-Kuezi. T. 1997: 2.
For the purpose of this paper^  foreign firms are considered those being in 
majority foreign ownership. Green-field sites;are considered those which did not 
exist in 1990. (Please not.that for the Foreign-Brownfield site category the 
sample is so small as to provide only a very limited usefulness m statistical 
analysis, and therefore, we shall be concentrating on results from this category. 
Missing data prevented, the proper green-field versus brow-field sites 
categorization'of two Hungarian firms, as well: as two foreign-owned firms. The 
results from these firms will be examined only in the broader national categories)
The sample is representative of the Szekesfehervar region, where the vast 
majority of FDI has been directed not on privatization projects (acquisition of the 
former state owned companies) but on green-field manufacturing sites. The 
region - which once gave locations for such „fLagship” socialist firms as Videotori 
in computer and consumer electronics, Ikarus the bus manufacturer etc: - has 
well-trained, inexpensive work-force, a relatively well-developed infrastructure,
and a variety of local and national investment incentives (e.g. including 5 and 10 
years tax holiday on profits, no local taxes for five years etc.) have attracted such 
leading-edge firms as Ford, IBM, Phillips, etc., which tend to concentrate their, 
local activities on assembly line operations. (Note: ten years later, these very 
generous local incentives for foreign-owned firms did create new type of conflicts 
between the subsidiaries of MNCs and the local governments. The current 
disputes have centered on the calculation bases of the local taxes.) (Toth, 1998: 
30.) /
3.1. Strengths and Challenges of the Firms Operating in the Region
The firms surveyed were relatively optimistic and gave themselves high 
marks concerned their advantages over the competitors. Quality (91.7 per cent), 
timely delivery\89.6 percent), and price (87.5 per cent) were listed as the:top 
three advantages by Hungarian firms, with state-owned firms giving themselves 
generally lower scores. Hungarian firms also rated those three factors as the 
most important, with user-friendliness, ecological environment and after sales 
£erroee.s beingjudged the least important. ... . .
Foreign-owned firms top-listed advantages were quality (96.3 per cent), after 
sales service (85.2 per cent), and technical standard/innovation (81.5 per cent). 
These firms rated quality, technical standards and after sales service as the most 
important factors, with user friendliness and an ecological environment being 
judged the least important.
When asked how their firms sustain competitive advantage, noticeable \ 
differences were noted between Hungarian and foreign-owned firms on issues ’. 
■relatingto:innovation. Internal research and-developmentactivities Iwere given , 
as a reason for competitive advantages by 62.5 per cent at foreign-owned firms' i 
compared to only 45.8 per cent at Hungarian-owned firms. .Similarly, pa ten t- 
ownership was given as a reason 62.5 per cent versus only 35.4 per cent. As shall! 
be discussed in more detail later, these differences can not be solely accounted for ; 
on the basis of on-site research and development, but rather, comp any-wide 
research and development. Larger, ihternsltion^corporations (MNCs) aire able to i 
garner more advantageous economies of scale in; research, and development than ; 
smaller domestic companies, and this phenomena is by no means limited to 
Hungary. (Cooke, 1998.) . - . - - !
Therefore, for smaller, domestic firms collaborative research undertakings may 
be especially important as a, way to lower initial costs .and;share risks. In. this ; 
respect, however, perhaps surprisingly i given an intuitively greater need, 
Hungarian-owned companies ..seem less active\ thanv theirs) foreign-owned] 
counterparts. The latter category reports stronger scores not only in co­
operation with EU institutions (50.0 .per cent: to 29.9' pei cent),1 but also in ;
national (62.5 per cent to 55.3 per cent) and regional (54.2 per cent to 43.8 per 
cent) co-operative ventures. Hungarian-owned companies also rate co-operative 
agreements, generically and in the region, national and international contexts, 
as less important than do foreign-owned companies.
Managers were also asked what challenges they see their firm facing. 
Responses reveal that foreign-owned firms slightly more pro-active, especially in 
regards to improving product quahty, cutting personnel costs and product 
development. Averages the scores for all possible challenges, foreign-owned firms 
responded in the affirmative 86.3 per cent, compared to 76.7 per cent for 
Hungarian firms. The smaller, newer Hungarian enterprises scored especially 
low on these questions. The follow up query, „Does your company respond to the 
following challenges?”, sheds further light on these Hungarian 'green-field' 
business, which returned the lowest scores of all categories in half of the 
responses listed. Of particular importance is the fact that only 33.3 per cent of 
Hungarian \green-field' sites plan any sort of product development (compared to 
a Hungarian average of 55.1 per cent and a foreign-owned average 75 per cent,), 
and only 22.2 per cent plan a R and D co-operation with other firms (again, it is 
exactly the smaller firms which stand the most to gain from such ventures). Here 
also, foreign-owned firms reported higher scores (on average 50.0 per cent versus 
40.8 percent), with particularly wide gaps being observed in responses such as 
increased outsourcing and product development. Of note is the fact that more 
Hungarian firms (61.2 per cent) plan to intensify internal R and D, compared to 
the foreign-owned firms (54.2per cent). See Table 12.
Hungarian
firms
niipanv o
Cutting
cost
Org.
Restruct
uring
Speeding
up
prod.dev.
Intens. 
internal 
R and D
Outsou
rcing
Subcont
racting
Marketing
co-peration
R and 
cooper.
Privately
owned
93.5.% 74.2 % 54.8 % 61.3 %, 25.8% . 38:7 % 61.3 % 35.5 %
Private/
State
ownership
87.5 % 87.5% 50.0% ■ 62.5% 37:5 % 12.5 % 75.0 % 37.5 %
State owned 100.0% 88.9 % 55.6%. 55.6 % 55.6 %. 33.3 % 55.6 % 55.6%
Green-field
site
100.0% 66,7 %, 33.3% 66.7 % 22.2% 22.2% 44.4 % 22.2 %
Brown-field
site
92.5 % 82.5 % 60.0% 60.0 % 37.5% 37.5 % 67.5 % 45.0 %
Total 93.9 % 79.6% 55.1 % 61.2 % 34.7 % 34.7% 63.3% 40.8 %
Foreign
firms
Green-field
site
100.0 % 84.2 % 73.7 % 57.9% 52.6 % 42.1 % 52.6 % 52.6%
Brown-field
site
100.0 % 75.0% 75.0 % 25.0 % 25.0 % 0.0 % 25.0 % 25.0%
Total 100.0 % 83.3 % 75.0 % 54.2 % 50,0% 37.5% 50.0 % 50.0 °A
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Source: Mako-Ellingstad-Kuczi. 1997:12.
It is worth noting, that the relatively heavier reliance of foreign-owned 
firms on outsourcing, one should keep in mind that this is an example of a 
practice which often makes more sense in the matured market economies than it 
does in the emerging market economies in the CEE. It originally arose in high 
wage countries as a result of significant wage gaps between core production 
workers and peripheral support staff. By outsourcing non-essential support 
functions, firms could save money and utilize more flexibility. However, in 
Hungary and other CEE countries, there are no significant wage differences to 
be found between direct and indirect production personnel (wages are generally 
uniformly low), and therefore, savings possibilities are lessened. The main reason 
for the reliance on outsourcing in Hungary has to do with flexibility.
3.2. Research/Development and Firms' Innovation Profiles
Questions regarding firms' individual and collaborative research and 
innovation efforts also reveal sizable rifts betweien Hungarian and foreign-owned 
companies. The biggest difference noted is not in absolute R and D expenditures, 
but rather in R and D expenditures as a proportion of turnover. Here, foreign- 
owned firms spent on average 0.21 per cent, compared to 2.06 per cent for 
Hungarian firms. It must be noted that all these figures are very small in the 
international context. (See Table 13!)
Table 13 Research and Development Profiles
Hungarian
Firms
R and D 
expend. 
In 1990 
(in 1000 
ECU)
R and D 
expend.
1995 
(in 1000 
ECU)
% R and D 
as 1995 
turnover
R and D 
staff, 
1995
% of total 
staff
Planning 
to expand 
R and D
Privately owned 22.9 36.7 160 2.48 % 1.59 7.55 33.3%
Private/State
ownership
5.0 0.71 14.3 0,14% 0.14 0.01 14.3 %
State owned 46.8 80.0 171 1.33 % 12.57 0.87 28.6 %
Green-field site - — 0.0 0.00 % 0.25 1.76 25.0 %
Brown-field site 20.43 53.95 181 2.50 % ; . 5.78 6.00 % 30.6%
Total 29.43 '38.95 132 2.06 . 3.14 5.06 ■ 29.5 %
Foreign Firms
Green-field site — 6.25 0.24 2.00 ' 0.43 15.8 %
Brown-field site 133.3 . 42.67 32;0 0.09 - . . 25:5 %
Total 133.3 38.95 29.2 0.21 3.30 0.56 20.0%
Source: Mako-Ellingstad-Kuczi, 1997: 16.
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Of special interest to us is the very marked lack o fR  and D profile for 
green-field firms. Hungarian green-field firms in absolute and relative terms, 
and foreign green-field firms in relative terms. Hungarian green-field firms 
reported spending nothing on research efforts in 1995. This may have to do with 
the service-oriented nature of these businesses, as well as not properly 
associating more mundane product development efforts as R and D. Informal R 
and D efforts may also escape notice in this category as well. As for foreign-owned 
green-field sites, it is particularly important for Hungary future development 
that they begin to take on a more active R and D profile, for the simple fact that 
they are now by far the fastest growing sector of the national economy, 
accounting for some 70 per cent of manufactured exports. If Hungary and other 
CEE economies are to move up the product ladder, they must be active not only in 
assembly and production, but also in research and design.
One reason for Hungary's very low R and D profile is simply the general 
contraction which has taken place; in the economy since the collapse of the state- 
socialist political-economic regime, with the myriad of effects this has had on 
firms reliant on domestic market. All too often, in Hungary and as in most other 
countries, „luxuries” such as R and D spending are the first to be sacrificed when 
companies are faced with tough times. Generally, foreign firms which have set 
up manufacturing operations in Hungary and other post-socialist countries o f 
CEE are interested not in the capacities of Hungarian scientists and engineers, 
but rather, in the generally inexpensive across-the-board labour costs. This is 
perfectly understandable, as they have possess the sufficient intellectual capital 
to produce and market successfully
As mentioned previously, there are temporal considerations at play here, too, 
however. Foreign managers who originally came with the sole intention of 
assembling products have slowly begun to notice that not only are Hungarian 
workers very capable of more flexible and diligent performance than workers in ■ 
the home country (such observations, for example, have been made by Audi, 
NOMA, General Electric, etc.) but also there is t a great- deal of untapped : 
. intellectual capital. Thus, we see the first sings (for. companies such as Audi, GE 
and Nokia) of foreign companies moving their research facilities! to be closer to 
their production facilities'.
When company .managers were asked how they become aware of 
innovations, no great differences were, noted by ownership categories, with the 
expectation of; a relatively greater reliance of state-owned firms on more 
traditional; mstitutipns such as universities and higher education institutes.;
7 sGenerally, however, these institutions - technology transfer agencies - received ; 
very low scores. , .. " :
Of particular note is that fact that Hungarian green-field firms - which 
we can consider small and medium sized firms, SMEs - haye particularly weak
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innovation network links. This category of firms used the various innovation 
sources 43.2 per cent on average, compared to a Hungarian average of 55.8 per 
cent and a foreign-owned average of 56.0 per cent.
When queried as to main partners in the product or process innovation, 
managers' responses yielded some very interesting-responses. Again, looking at 
Hungarian green-fields characterised by the absence of formalised institutions 
(contract research agencies, universities, subsidy providers, government 
agencies) in any innovation role. (We must surmise that to the extent 
programmes designed to aid Hungarian small and medium sized business 
development are available (generally, they are just now beginning operations, 
often with various EU programme funds), Hungarian SMEs seem unaware, or 
are unwilling to participate. ,
In contrast to Hungarian SMEs, state-owned firms appear to be the most 
connected to traditional, co-operative efforts, especially in conjunction with 
government-sponsored efforts. The vast majority of both Hungarian and foreign- 
owned companies claim that the major source of product/process innovations are 
customers and suppliers. This serves to underscore the point to why it is so 
important for Hungarian firms to become a more active part of the component 
supply networks of the more technologically advanced foreign-owned firms 
operating in Hungary. Without such relationships, technology and management 
knowledge and organisation transfer is an indirect, convoluted, and often non­
existent process. ' - ■ ,
Dramatic differences are noticed as to the location of main customers, 
suppliers and . consultants between Hungarian and foreign-owned firms. See in 
detail Table 14!
Table 14 Location of Firms' Customers. Suppliers and Consultants
Location of the main p artner Hungarian-owned firms Foreign-owned firms
Customer- Region - 80.0% 52.2 %
Customer - Nation 75.6 % 65.2 %
Customer - EU 37.8 % 73.9 %
Customer - Rest of World • 22.2 % . 26.1 %
Suppliers - Region , 64.4 % 34.8%
Suppliers - Nation . 68.9% 39.1%. .
Suppliers - EU. 44.4% . 73.9 %
Suppliers- Rest of World 24.4 % 21.7 %
Consultants - Region 22.2%. . 13.0%
Consultants - Nation 37.8 % 39.1 %
Consultants - EU 13.3% 69.6%
Consultants - Rest of world 2.2% 34.8 %.
Source: Mako-Ellingst, ad-Kuczi. 1997: 19.
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On average, customers were located in the region and nation for a 
combined total of 155.6 per cent for Hungarian firms, compared to combined total 
of 117.2 per cent for foreign-owned firms. Differences are even more striking 
when looking at the arguably more important location of suppliers; here 
Hungarian firms rated a regional/national combined total of 133.3 per cent, 
compared to a mere 73.9 per cent for foreign-owned firms. Concurrently, foreign- 
owned firms rely on foreign partners for main customers and suppliers much 
heavier than Hungarian firms. Differences in the consultants category, where 
foreign-owned firms rely overwhelmingly on foreign-consultants (104.4 per cent 
to 15.5per cent for Hungarian firms), can. be ascribed to both the more expensive 
nature of international consultancies, as well as company-wide relations built up 
with a given set of international consultant firm networks.
3.3. Region as an Economic Plaver in the Transformation Process
The great majority of firms - both Hungarian and foreign owned 
companies - surveyed in the ,,Szekesfehervar-region” (86.7 per cent) expressed 
such a view that the regional industrial culture plays positive role in the firm- 
level innovation process. This extremely favorable opinion on the innovation 
friendly regional industrial culture of the firms partly contradicts the opinions of 
the key institutional players in the regional innovation system. According to the 
latter view, the innovation supporting culture and regional innovation policy 
have marginal importance. The evidences learned from the REGIS Project 
supports the opinion of the regional institutional players. Especially clusters and 
official networks (which have been seen as strong factors in some other regions 
participating in the REGIS Project like in Baden-Wurtenberg, Basque country 
and Wales) have negligible effects in this region. It is not by chance, that beside 
the lack a natural resource - which is a geographical characteristic about which 
not much can be done - another weakness is the lack or low density of institutions 
which could be function as innovation supporters. The other disadvantageous 
feature of the region surveyed was the lack of trust relations among the economic 
actors.
As concerning the advantages or innovation potential of the region ; 
investigated, it is necessary te mention the large pool of firms with well 
developed production methods, as well as high quality of human resources - 
including both blue collar and professional (managerial) groups. The rich reserve i 
of highly skilled and flexible workforce is a „eommon product” of the long- 
industrial tradition of the ,,Szekesfehervar region” and the co-presence of the 
newly founded SMEs and MNCs. For example, the presence of such global 
economic players as IBM, Ford, Alcoa, Phillips etc. could serve as a potential 
„integrating factor” between the firms of the region/nation and the international 
economy. (In the next section we focus our attention on the fundamentals of this
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integration function or using another term, on the multiplier effects of the 
presence of foreign companies.)
Evaluating advantages and disadvantages of the regional economy from 
the point of view of the firms' innovation process, the key lessons are the 
followings. The regional ^physical capital’’ (ice. development of transportation and 
communication infrastructure) ranks behind the quality of available work-force 
and the presence (or pool) of firms having developed production methods. In this 
respect, it is interesting to compare the results of the „Szekesfehervar-region” 
study with another regional economy study aimed at to understand the complex 
role of the region in the transformation process.
Recently, several case studies were have focused on the transformation 
process in the „Berlin-Brandenburg region” in the unified Germany. In case 
studies, roughly similar regional characteristics - as were used in the Hungarian 
REGIS Project - were evaluated by the firms operating in this region.(4)
The key results on the attractiveness of „public goods” in the „Berlin- 
Brandenburg” region are summarized in the Table 15.
Table 15 Regional Factors Playing Role in the Economic Success of the Firm
(Subsidiaries of West German Firms in Berlin-Brandenburg Region)
Regional characteristics . Evaluation of Regional Characteristics by 
Firms
1.Availability of a highly , qualified 
workforce
D1 (++), D2(++), D3(++), D4(++), D5(++), 
D6(++),D7(++),D8(++) (*)
2.Availability of cheap workforce (**)
D7(+), D8(+), D9(+)
3.Proximity to the most important 
customers
Dl(++), D2(++), D3(++) .... D6(+), (***), 
D7(++), D8(+) (***)
4.Proximity to the most important input 
suppliers
Dl(++),
D2(++)......................................D8(H-)
5. Proximity to the most important 
suppliers o f . services relevant to the 
company
Dl(++), ... D3(++), ... D5(+) (****) ... D7(+), 
D8(++), D9(+) .
6.Proximity to research institutions ........................... D5(++)
7.A competent local government ,D1(++), (*****), D2(+), ... D4(++), D5(++) 
(******), D7(++), (*******), D8(+).
8 .A relatively well developed infrastructure 
in the region
... D2(+), D3(++), D4(++), ... D6(++), D7(+), 
D8(++), D9(++).
Notes; (*) ++: very important. +: important,' not, listing: unimportant,
(**) The personnel managers of companies D1 and D3 see stable and high wages 
ass an important incentive increasing productivity. Hence, he does not think that 
paying the lowest wags possible is desirable. Company D2 has made bad 
experiences with cheap labor.
(***) “Contacts are more important than geographical proximity.”
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(****) Here the manager in charge of procurement mentioned the' proximity of 
service suppliers which had been separated out of the original Kombinat and are 
independent companies now.
(*****) “This would be highly desirable ... but there is no solidarity with East 
German products. The West German lobbies have more power in East German 
local government, than the lobbies representing local industry have A . , The 
Prokurist in company D2. has similar opinion when he states that in practice the. 
company receives no support from the local government.
(******) Company D5 describes its relationship with the local government as good 
since it is one of the biggest employers in that quarter of Berlin, and are thus in 
regular contact with the authorities.
(*******) The Senate is the main customer of company D7, thus its competence is 
very important to this company. A manager in company D9 however stated: „If this 
was of any importance at all to mir success, than we : would .have long left 
Brandenburg.” - - • - ' ’ • • ' : ; ‘
Source: Enese Lieb-Doczy (1997) Acquisition and the Transformation: Process, (A 
comparative Case Studies: from Eastern Germany and Hungary), Warwick: 
Department of Economics - -University of Warwick, . (Unpublished' Ph.D. 
Dissertation), p. 33. . . .........-
Data from the Table 13 indicate the similar tendency identified by the 
RGIS Project carried out in the ,,Szekesfehervar region” in Hungary. For instance,
( the existence of the well developed infrastructure as a key source for the local 
j  economic regeneration is the mainstream view among the regional developers 
and FDI experts in the country. Not downplaying the important role of the 
| physical capital (e.g. transportation* communication etc.) in the regional 
j economic development, it is worth to note that the ^relatively, well developed ’ 
| infrastructure” in the region as an attractive factor for the FDI ranks behind the i 
i availability of a ,,highly qualified workforce”. The „cqmpeteht local government” ; 
! takes the third place among the regional characteristics to the economic success I 
| of the firms. What makes the post-socialist; countnesTof; GEE region attractive to.) 
foreign investors is not only, the cheap labor but rather the combination o f 
cheaper but niore significantly.{highly trained and flexible workforce: „ ... ;
j regional 'physical capital' rahks so far behind the impdrtance of regional human i 
i capital'.” (Enese Lieb-Doczy, .1997: 14-15.) In relation with the importance of;
the .'regional human capital' compared with the 'physical one', it is necessary to 
i mention that, i f  the present competitive advantage based mainly on cheaper 
labor and the related price advantages, this may harm in the long-run economic 
| development of the post-socialist economies of the CEE region] „ ... it is not likely 
to be sufficient for sustained long term growth. At best, it can provide the basis 
for market entry and an opportunity to earn resources that must immediately be 
invested upgrading the firms' assets and thus the economy's asset base also.” 
(Smallbone, 1997:2)
Unfortunately, until now, it has been impossible to identify; any visible and
.comprehensive national and regional economic policy initiatives which may 
support the sustainable growth, in developing long-term competitive advantages 
of such strong region as „Szekesfehervar”. . .
3.4. Weak Multiplier Effects of FDI: Input and Output Profiles of the Firms in 
r,Szekesfehervar” region ’ .... . .....
The product input and output profiles of firms operating in the 
„Szekesfehervar-region” are important when considering not only individual firm 
success (dynamic, successful companies tend to have a stronger than average 
output or export profile), but the shape and intensity of a wide range of existing 
and emerging regional networks. Firms which utilise the region for only a small 
portion of their product inputs are unlikely to have a strong interest in helping 
develop a regionally-based set of institutions which promote inter-firm or public- 
private co-operation.
One of the strongest, most significant set of differences between 
ownership nationality categories visible in the REGIS Project survey has to do 
with the input/output (or import/export) profiles exhibited. Managers were asked 
to give percentage scores for product inputs, and output, differentiated by, the 
Szekesfehervar region, Hungary, European Union, and finally, the rest of the 
world. Foreign-owned firms, especially foreign-owned green-field sites, report 
using very few Hungarian inputs (either .components or raw materials) in the 
production process. On average, foreign-owned firm rely on the region for only 9.3 
per cent, and on the nation for only 21.8 per cent of product inputs. Together; this 
gives a domestic content ratio of 31.1 percent (only 22.2 percent in the case of 
green-field sites). By contrast, and not surprisingly, Hungarian firms 
demonstrate far heavier reliance on domestic component producers. Hungarian 
firms on average rely on the region for 27.8 per cent, and on the nation for 46.4 
per cent of product inputs, yielding a domestic content ratio of 74.2 per cent (83.3 
per cent in the case of state-owned firms). See Table 16. : ;
Table 16 Product Inputs of the Firms: Szekesfeher region
Hungarian
Firms
Region Hungary ■ . E U  . Rest of World
Privately owned 25.9 % 44.7% 16.0% 6.9 %
Private/State.
ownership
31.0 % 55.1 % 1.4% 0.0 %
State owned 33.9 % " 49.4 % ' 14:8 % 1.9 %
Green-field site 30.3 % ■ ' 29.2 % :: 13.8 % ' 4.4%
Brown-field site ’ 27.2 % 50.3 % : 15.1% ' 4.9 % '
Total 27.8 % - '46.4%' ' 14.8 % ' 4.8%
Foreign Firms
27
Green-field site 7.1%' . 15.1 % 63.5 % 14.5%. .
Brown-field site 22.5 % 54.3 % , 20.8% 2.5 %
Total 9.3 % 21.8 % . - . 54.9% 14.0
Source: Mako-Ellingstad-Kuczi. 19£17:7.
In accounting for such large gulfs, one must consider that a great many 
green-field sites were offered „off-shore” status, which grants duty-free 
importation of production components. Hungarian firms, and foreign-owned 
brown-field sites are generally not granted duty-free importation allowances. 
„Off-shore” status creates a very powerful disincentive te search for regional or 
national supplier networks, especially as many of these firms have an already 
existing European or world-wide supplier network. (When queried as to why 
domestic content rates are so low, many foreign managers cite the lack of 
contacts among potential Hungarian firms, as well as quality concerns. 
According to another study, carried out in the same period as the REGIS Project 
(1996-1997), out of the quality and flexibility concern, the most unfavourable 
features of the Hungarian suppliers concerned the 'timely delivery' and 
'reliability'. Akar, 1997:6.)
Such a heavy reliance on imported components does come with a price, however. 
Logistical concerns having to do with on-time delivery of components (especially 
when one considers that 41.7 per cent of foreign-firms and 44.4 per cent of 
foreign-owned green-field companies rely on Just-in-Time inventory control 
systems) consistently rank as one of the biggest problems facing mangers at 
foreign-owned green-field sites. (The reliance of the green-field sites on JIT 
inventory control system especially high (55 per cent) in the automobile sectors' 
firms in the region surveyed.)
Multiplier effects are notoriously vague and difficult to quantify, but it  is 
obvious that such a heavy reliance on imported components (often those with the 
highest value-added), makes any such effects in the Szekesfehervar region, and 
Hungary as a whele, relatively modest. From the perspective of innovation, 
technological diffusion from high-tech, green-field plants to domestic producers is 
severely limited by the heavy reliance on imported components or on their own 
suppliers already operating in Hungary. From the ecological standpoint, such a 
situation is not without objections, as the distances imported components travel 
(most often by lorry) are much greater than domestic components.
It must be added, the temporal components associated with FDI flows 
should also be considered, and even at this early point in. time, it is evident that, 
the above-listed characteristics are beginning to change for the better. Networks - 
whether for supply, research and development, or distribution - do not arise 
spontaneously. As foreign-owned companies accumulate positive experiences 
manufacturing in Hungary, it is hoped they will gradually begin: to expand local
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production beyond low value-added assembly operations. Audi, GE and Nokia, 
for example, have begun to move some research and development facilities to 
Hungary to be closer to their production sites, and a number of foreign-owned 
companies have begun making the first moves towards building a local supplier 
network. Ford, for instance, is to locate a Central European components buying 
center in Hungary in the next years, following GM's lead of opening the same 
type of facility in Poland.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the above-listed figures, there is also a 
wide gulf in product outputs (exports), with Hungarian-owned firms relying 
heavily on the domestic market, and foreign-owned firms (again, green-field 
firms in particular) being especially active exporters. Hungarian-owned firms 
export; on average, only 15.6 per cent of output, with state-owned firms being the 
strongest exporters, while foreign-owned firms export a dramatic 54.5 per cent 
(61.6 per cent for green-field sites). See Table 17!
Table 17 Product Output of Firms operating in Szekesfehervar Region
Hungarian
Firms
Region Hungary EU Rest of World
Privately owned 47.2 % . 40.5 % 8.6% 3.7 %
Private/State
ownership
56.8% 34.0 % 9.3 % 0.0%
State owned 36.4 % 39.2 % 5.9% 18.4 %
Green-field site 58.1 % 37.5% _ 3.8% 0.6%
Brown-field site 43.4 % 38.9 % 11.0 % 6.8 %
Total 45.8 % 38.7% 9.8 % 5.8 %
Foreign Firms
Green-field site 15.7% 22.8 % 49.6 % 12.0 %
Brown-field site 30.0 % 47.3% 16.3% 6.5 %
Total 16.7 % 25.0 % 43.7% 10.8 %
Source :Mak6-Ellingstad-Kuczi. 1997:9.
Three observations need to be made about the survey findings regarding 
patterns of output or export. Firstly, is the overwhelming dominance of the EU as 
an export target, which while having much to do with geographic proximity and 
buying power, also is affected by the EU's trading regime which gives products 
coming from the CEE countries slightly preferential tariff status (as a result of 
Association Agreements). To qualify for such preferential tariffs, the products 
must have a domestic and/or European Union content of over 50 per cent. Many 
foreign-owned green-field sites (as well as, for example, nearly all automobile 
manufacturers present in Hungary) qualify for preferential tariffs based on 
European Union, not domestic content.
Secondly, one notices the marked collapse of any strong alternative
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market for Hungarian exporters. Less than ten years ago, the Soviet Union and 
CMEA trading bloc was the destination of the majority of Hungarian exports. 
The lapse of the ruble-based trading system, the collapse of buying power of 
consumers in these countries, as well as the very pronounced political guidance 
towards western markets has hurt Hungarian producers which relied on the 
CMEA markets.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, one must be aware of the 
weakness of the domestic market. Consumer buying power and real wages have 
dropped sharply since 1989 (with a 15 per cent drop in real earning registered in 
the middle of 1990's), which has hurt Hungarian companies, which by size and 
tradition tend to be domestically focused, much more than foreign-owned 
companies. While sloe improvement in buying power, and a general stabilization 
of macro-economic indicators - from 1997/98 - will have a positive effect on all 
sectors of the economy, this will be an especially welcome development for the 
Hungarian small and medium sized firms (SMEs).
In relation te the composition and locations of suppMers-customers, it is 
. worth noting the following tendencies. When asked if their company is supplying , 
one or a few dominant suppliers, 66.0 per cent of mangers at Hungarian-owned 
; companies replying „yes”, as compared with 76.9 per cent at foreign-owned firms : 
i (85.0 per cent at foreign-owned green-field sites). The follow-up question, which ; 
asked what share of sales goes to the most important customer, reveals 32.4 per 
cent at Hungarian-owned companies and 56.8 per cent at foreign-owned 
companies. The relatively greater dependence of foreign-owned companies on one 
or a few customers may be at least partially accounted for by the fact that many 
, of the foreign-owned green-field operations are often processors, producers or 
assemblers for their company's own world-wide production chain (i.e., there is a 
■ noticeable lack of on-site integrated processes at the foreign-owned green-field ; 
plants, as it is part of comp any-wide vertically-integrated production process.)
Parallel to input/output or import/export profiles axe the locations of 
primary competitors. Foreign-owned companies viewed the European Union or 
the rest of the world as the location fora score of 100 percent, compared to 60 per 
cent for the region and Hungary. By. contrast, Hungarian-owned firms saw gave a 
combined external score of 41.7 percent,, and 112.5 per cent for the region and 
Hungary.'.It is apparent that. Hungarian and foreign-owned firms have 
significantly different geographical horizons.
Conclusions
This paper aimed to analyse various dimensions of the inward 
investments - or Foreign Direct Investments - in the Hnngarian economy. The 
focus in our investigation was the firm, which is a key institution ih re-organizing
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economic activities in the emerging market economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. For the better understanding of the extremely complex nature of 
changing social-orgianizational relations of the post-socialist firms, sector and 
region as often neglected variables were selected for the purpose of our 
investigation. Machine industry - which is often looked as an economic barometer 
of the national economy - was selected as a sector. Concerning the region, which 
was the other key variable of our analyses, a region with -high concentration of 
FDI (Szekesfehervar) was selected. ,
The survey of the firm-level transformation process in the machine 
industry sector revealed the followings. First, the sector or meso-level analysis of 
the transformation process is more informative than the broad macro-level 
figures, most casual observers rely on in studying changes in the post-socialist 
countries. Second, evaluating the firm-level transformation process in the 
machine industry, we discovered an uneven speed of social and organizational 
learning process within the so-called "Visegrad-countries'. Third, the uneven 
development of the firm-level transformation process could be explained partly 
by the variations in the pre-history and the strategies privatization and partly by 
the „mono” or „hetero” patterns of Foreign Direct Investments; Combination of 
strategic privatization and variety in ownership structure and the presence of 
hetero pattern of FDI (balanced structure of 'green-field' and 'brown-field' 
investments) accelerated the organizational and managerial learning process. 
Fourth, the out of the earlier mentioned characteristics of privatization, the 
cooperative character of the firm-level labour relations further facilitated - or 
speeded up - the restructuring process of the Hungarian firms.
Lessons from the survey in the most FDI attracted region in Hungary 
could be summarized in the way. First, the types of ownership of the firms (e.g. 
Hungarian owned versus foreign owned, green-field versus brown-field sites etc.) 
are playing a significant filtering role in the competitiveness and innovation 
capacities of the companies. Second, the multiplier effects normally associated 
with manufacturing facilities (many of which are high-tech and produce high 
value-added products) are largely missing from the Hungarian environment. 
Third, there is a surprisingly large gap between Hungarian owned and foreign- 
owned firms in the following fields: competitive strength, innovation capacities, 
customers-suppliers relations and product input/output profiles. Fourth, the 
Hungarian small and medium sized firms - or the Hungarian green-field plants - 
show a strong tendency towards technological, product and process stagnation in 
comparison with the foreign-owned firms. In addition, to spending almost 
nothing on R and D projects, not one Hungarian green-field plant reporting 
participation in any kind of technology/innovation/training supporting programs. 
Fifth, the Hungarian small and medium sized firms have particularly weak 
innovation networks. Especially, Hungarian 'green-field' plants characterized by 
the absence of formalized partner institutions (e.g. government agency, subsidy 
providers, university etc.) Finally, according to the experiences of the regional
survey major source of innovation (both product and process) are customers and 
suppliers. This finding underscores the point why it is so important for 
Hungarian firms to become a more active part of the component supply networks 
of the technelogically advanced foreign-owned firms operating in the country.
Summing up the key conclusions from both sector and region centered 
studies, we would like to stress the following points concerning our findings. 
Transfer of ownership from state to various types of private one is not sufficient 
conditions for the restructuring process of economic activities in the post-socialist 
firnis. Beside the variation in markets, available resources etc. the cooperative 
versus confrontational character of the firm-level labour relations have strong 
impact on the speed and success of the economic restructuring of companies. For 
the better understanding of the impacts (e.g. modernization of management, 
multiplier mechanisms etc.) of inward investments (FDI), it would be advisable 
in the future to pay more attention on suppliers - customer's relations both in the 
sector and the region targeted research projects. Finally, to maintain the present 
relatively high level of the FDI in Hungary, it would be necessary to create 
regional level development agencies which could work closely with managers of 
both foreign-owned and Hungarian-owned firms.(5) The core function of this 
agency would be to guarantee interface with the relevant local authorities and 
public utilities to provide suitable infrastructural support.
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Notes
(1) The Hokkaido Project was initiated and coordinated by Professor Rihito 
Yamamura, Hokkaido University, Slavic Research Center, in co-operation with 
Professor Akihiro Ishikawa, Chuo University, Institute for Social Sciences, 
Tokyo. The survey was conducted in Spring 1996, at the machine industry 
sector. The sample includes 35 firms in Hungary, 30 firms in Czech Republic 
and Poland and 24 firms m Slovakia. The firms surveyed have at least, 500 
employees. In order to create a statistically representative sample, the firms 
participating in the Project were located at least three or four different 
economic zones (regions) (e.g. 'strong': and 'weak' regions) in each 
participating countries. In the Hungarian case, the statistically representative 
sample was designed by a team of statisticians. Structured or focused- 
interviews were conducted by researchers and graduate students from the 
Department of Management and Organization, at the Budapest University of 
Economic Sciences. The Hungarian research (national) team was coordinated 
by Csaba Mako, scientific advisor at the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences and professor at the Department of Management and 
Organization at the Budapest University of Economic Sciences. Using the 
same research design and methods, at the spring of 1997, the textile and 
clothing industry were surveyed by the Hokkaido Project international 
research team. Unfortunately, concerning the later survey, the Hungarian 
research team evaluated only the Hungarian data and until yet had no chance 
to use other countries data.
(2) The rank of 'world competitiveness' of the countries (46 countries) is 
established by the. International Management Institute (Lausanne) and World 
Economic Forum (Davos). The two institutes evaluations are based on the 
opinions of leading managers of the 4300 large, and medium sized firms. In 1998, 
eight issues representing 259 criterions were evaluated by countries. USA, 
Singapore and Hong Kong are keeping their leading positions but Japan 
gradually loosing. For example, Japan was leading in the country 
competitiveness list for ten years, but presently lost 9 places and located in the 
18th position between Sweden and Island. (Heti Vilaggazdasag, 1998. 18.sz., 
majus, p. 33.
(3)The REGIS Project was carried out in 1996-1997 in eleven European Regions: 
(1). Baden-Wiirtenberg, (Germany) (2). SE Brabant, (Netherland), (3). Styria, 
(Austria),( 4). Tampere, (Finland), (5). Wales, (U.K.), (6). Wallonia, (Belgium), (7). 
Basque country, (Spain), (8). Centro, (Portugal), (9). Friuli, (Italy), (10). 
Szekesfehervar, (Hungary), (11) Lower Silezia, (Poland). In the Western 
European regions 833 firms, and m the CEE regions (in Hungary and in Poland) 
165 firms participated in the survey aimed to study various dimensions of the 
Company and regional-level innovation systems. The REGIS Project was
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coordinated by Philip Cooke, Center fori Advanced Studies, Cardiff University,
UK and the participating institutions and researchers are the followings:
• University of Basque Country - Spain (G. Etxebarria),
• University of Avelro - Portugal (E. de Castro)
• University of Louvain - Belgium (M. Quevit)
• Aniversity of Tampere - Finland (G. Scienstock)
• University of Economics Vienna - Austria (F. Toedthng)
• University of Udine, - Italy (M. Schenkel)
• TNO and Technopolis - Netherland (P. Boekholt)
• University of Warsaw - Poland (A.. Kukhnski)
• Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Hungary (Cs. Mako)
(4) The research on the acquisition and transformation process in the „Berlin- 
Brandenburg” region is carried out by Enese Lieb-Doczy, a Ph. D. student from 
the Department of Economics, University of Warwick. Within the framework 
of this project, 9 case studies were used to evaluate the relations (interactions) 
between FDI and the firms' restructuring process. One of the key ambitions of 
this project was to identify the impact of FDI in the East German subsidiaries 
of the West; German firms on the following fields: a), restructuring economic 
activities in the firms concerned, b). know-how transfer, c). relations of the 
subsidiaries with Other local and industrial firms.
(5) In attracting inward investment (FDI), Waleis region case in UK, could be very 
instructive for the Hnngarian national level, but mostly regional level 
economic players. The Wales Development Agency (WDA) is working closely
; with managers of foreign-owned companies. To illustrate the efficiency of the 
WDA, it is worth to mention the case of SONY - which now has factory in 
Hungary, too. SONY arrived to the region in 1973 and carried out heavy 
investment: According to the recent study of the; Cardiff University Business 
School, 20 000 infrastructural jobs are how reliant on SONY. ( The Financial 
7Y/nes(1998) 'Agency plays key role in making a dream comes true', July-16, p.
iv.) ' ' - ■■■■••
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